

631 sought to strengthen the hands of those favoring decentralization in the
 647 belief that this would accomplish more with American aid money. On the
 [177] other hand, those who favor strong centralization tend to think of govern-
 ment primarily in political rather than administrative terms. They see
 government as an arena where personalities and parties struggle for the
 opportunity of directing the affairs of state. They realize that much political
 power is built on patronage or at least the promise of patronage; they also
 argue that the political process is built upon compromise and that many
 administrative practices are established in governmental bureaus to fore-
 stall any such compromises. Which group is prompted more by disinter-
 ested, public-spirited motives can best be determined by the observer on
 the spot as different personalities, representing these varying points of view,
 step onto the stage.

664

THE PEASANT AND POLITICS

Shortly after my arrival in Greece in the fall of 1952, I encountered an
 interesting case study of the peasant and politics. All over Greece, one
 September Sunday, the farmers demonstrated against their government.
 This affair was treated, as one would expect, quite differently by the various
 Athenian newspapers, but the general tone of argument never got down to
 the facts of the peasants' grievance but instead haggled over who was re-
 sponsible for getting them all stirred up.

[204] One newspaper, *Philelevtheros*, under the caption "The Farmers' Plight,"
 wrote:

There is no Greek who does not admit the rights of the farmers, or the fact
 that they are, and always were, the most neglected class in this country. Every-
 one feels the farmers' plight as if it were his own, and they know that Greek
 society will never stand on its feet as long as the farmer's lot is a miserable one.
 Their present fate, however, is not the fault of the Government, but is due to
 a whole century of reactionary rule. The farmers' demonstrations would have
 been even stronger and more genuine if the Rally Party agents had not at-
 tempted to exploit them. However, they failed in this attempt.

[204] *Ethnos*, a newspaper representing a rival party, reported under the cap-
 tion "Farmers' Demonstrations":

Over the whole of Greece, in all those areas where men strive to get the
 maximum crop from our not very fertile soil, solid demonstrations were held
 last Sunday. The farmers were protesting with absolutely justified indignation
 against the indifference the Government is showing in handling their prob-
 lems, and the way in which it has withdrawn its promises to them.

In the face of this Pan-Hellenic uprising, the Government, through its comic
 Minister of Coordination, and through its press, finds nothing better to give in

662 replaced. Indications such as these showed the importance of the legislature
664 in keeping the administrative apparatus in check, but did not provide any
guidelines as to how this might best be done.

● 665 But this approach has its negative overtones as well. Over and over again
662 I was told that such-and-such a thing was impossible for the village because
it had not voted in support of the party in power. This was one of the points
cited by a prosperous Greek merchant, who travels much throughout the
country, when he listed changes he considered necessary in the rural parts
of the country:

1. Smaller interest rates so there will be greater ease in handling money.
2. Less red tape so that the peasant when he comes to borrow money for a drill doesn't spend more money waiting than he spends for the pump.
3. State employees must understand that they are in the service of the people, especially the peasants, and not expect to be bribed to get a job done.
4. Greater justice so that the gendarme and judge are not primarily interested in a person's party affiliation but will carry out justice.

In other words, party affiliation may influence the administration of justice. From another point of view, working through a member of parliament is really the peasant's way of trying to get around a law. To do this is considered a great accomplishment, for he thinks that rules are made to be broken and evaded. This is because the rules have been made by others whose criteria for developing them are different from his own. For him, individual criteria are more important than rules others have made.

662 I had an impression, gained from hundreds of conversations with peasants throughout Greece, that the peasant prefers the political to the administrative approach. At first, the explanation was hard to find because it was obvious everywhere that the government agencies, though inefficient at times, were helping him reconstruct his destroyed home, assisting him in the purchase of agricultural equipment, teaching his wife and daughters how to can tomatoes and cook fish, and bringing more water to his parched fields. The reason became apparent, however, when I remembered that the
571 Greek peasant is more interested in personal relationships than he is in
662 things or in concrete achievements. He complains if he does not have things, especially if those in other villages are getting them, but does not value them in their own right. They are a measure of how his personal relationships are working out. He honestly feels that he can deal with the politicians sent up from his district to parliament and continues to share this optimistic frame of mind no matter how many times he has been disappointed in the past. Of course, he is content to work through the government official if he can personalize that relationship, to his own advantage, and not be treated as an anonymous citizen who must be dealt with impartially in keeping with the rules. He would rather be dealt with as a person

Local Government

239

and receive fewer material rewards than to be dealt with impersonally and receive more material goods. Efficiency, then, whether in administration or in farm work, is something he does not initially value; he must be taught to value it if it is to assume any importance in his life.

As many observers have pointed out, the Greek — be he peasant or city dweller — is not loyal to an abstract political principle, nor is he loyal to a political organization as such.¹⁰ He is loyal to a political leader but only so long as following that leader does not mean that he must become disloyal to himself and go against his own cherished opinions of what ought to be done. Therefore, he can switch from one political leader to another without any sense of betrayal and sees no inconsistency in contradictory political behavior because he does not behave by the principles by which contradictions are gauged. Each situation is a separate case to be judged by itself and precedents have little relevance.

The peasant, sitting in his smoke-filled coffeehouse, is interested in hearing what others say about politics in Athens, not because he feels very closely identified with one party or the other, but because he tries to figure out what the meaning of each event is for his own particular existence. Few villagers are truly partisan in their political allegiance, which explains why it is almost impossible to maintain even a semblance of a party organization in a village. The parties do not even try. When elections are coming up, the candidates know the names of local people who have been sympathetic in the past and, through their help, try to work up a little political rally at which they can state why they should be supported for office. Around election time I chanced to be in several villages when these candidates made their appearance. On the whole, they drew small crowds, and even those who had decided to vote for them did not bother to go take a look at their chosen man. If this office seeker is to be "used" later on, one would think that here would be an excellent opportunity for the villager to establish the personal contact he might later exploit. But the peasant does not think this far ahead and, furthermore, probably assumes that the need for the politician's help might not arise.

When I listened to the peasants criticize their politicians, even those for whom they had voted and still supported, I realized that a foreigner might be tempted to read too much disapproval in comments which were made primarily to build up the ego of the critic. For, when I turned to such a critic after he had devastatingly, in his opinion, torn some program or political position to shreds, and asked "what do you suggest that the political leaders do instead?", the only reply given was: "I don't know because I'm not a politician."

I was also interested to note that there was relatively little disruptive political factionalism in a Greek village. Forty percent of the people may tend to support one party or leader, and they are not apt to switch to back

662
571
461

665
829

666
665
829

665
829
156

665
578
666

665 the rival party the other sixty percent support. However, should occasion
578 seem opportune, a great number of them might switch to the support of a
666 third party simply as a means of expressing disapproval of the performance
of the ones they have been supporting. But let the men of a village find
some common denominator, such as the erection of a school or a church
building, and they will forget their political differences.

829 In conclusion, the best way to characterize "the peasant and politics" is
66 in terms of indifference. This is especially true if one looks on politics as
369 an organized way of bringing certain measures to pass through the election
of officials committed to carrying them out. This has never worked for the
Greek peasant in the past, and he is dubious about its merits in the future.
If one means by politics the utilization of personal and family contacts
with politicians and officials to get some gain for oneself, then the peasant
can understand its significance and see its value. For, after all, politics and
politicians are associated with the city and especially with Athens. Villagers
are caught up in the backwash and, in their view of the world, have little
importance as active agents. Political phenomena, like the weather, have
to be endured, although now and then some useful protection from each
might be sought in personal initiative, but not by group effort.

197
538

poor in those abstract words of the arts and sciences which were not the concern of the common people who kept it living. Today, this lack of abstract words is the despair of the modern poet who wishes to express a thought of any metaphysical nicety, and he is driven to paraphrase or symbol.

Since the eighteenth century, when the demotic had crystallized in folk poetry, the battle between the use of purist and demotic in prose and poetry has raged, but the battle has finally been won by the demotic. Today the contemporary poet may hold his expression on a living language and borrow his vocabulary as he can from a rich tradition of three thousand years, from Ancient, Hellenistic, Byzantine, Medieval, and Modern Greek and its many dialects, and especially from the purist itself.¹¹

Not just poets but almost any literate Greek can construct a private language of his own, within limits to be sure, and use a vocabulary which others may understand and appreciate but which they themselves would never use under the same circumstances. A person is always on safe ground in criticizing the sentence structure, vocabulary, and idiom of a Greek writer, since he is criticizing what is of necessity a personalized style. In other words, the Greek language is still evolving, which means that "the language question" has perennially plagued the school authorities.

[872]

197
872

Should, for example, the beginning pupils in the first grade start out learning to read and write the kind of Greek they speak at home (demotike), or should they start out studying a kind of Greek which they cannot understand but which they will have to learn to understand if they are to be considered educated? There seems to have been little disagreement over the matter of teaching the purist Greek in the secondary school. That is an accepted fact. But what about the elementary school?

[873]

In the beginning of the new state in 1830, the purist language was supposed to be used throughout the whole school system, even with the beginning pupils. By 1911 people were suggesting that maybe it would be best to use demotike in the elementary school but the Royalists, then a political opposition party, raised such a hue and cry that action was deferred. The Royalists were supported in their stand by some professional men "on the grounds of prestige, and from some teachers who only knew the grammar of the *katharevousa*."¹²

● [665]

In 1917 Venizelos adopted the proposal, but when the Royalists came to power in 1920,

they forbade the use of *demotike* in schools and made a public bonfire of the new textbooks which had just been written in it. Chaos followed. Every change in government meant a change in the medium of primary education: in 1922 *demotike* was reintroduced by Plastiras; in 1925 Pangelos forbade its use; in 1928, it was restored by the Coalition government with the proviso that *katharevousa* should be taught four hours weekly in the two top forms; in 1932, *katharevousa* was to be taught in all forms; in 1933 the two top forms were to

THE VILLAGE NOTABLES

554 Contrary to popular belief, one does not always find the village notables sitting around the coffeehouse. Most of them are usually busy people, working in their fields, around their houses, or in a shop. They do make at least brief appearances around the square some time during the day, most probably after supper. Loafers do not become notables in a Greek village. To learn who these notables were, I asked throughout mainland Greece: "Who are the most important people in your village? Why are they important?"

[622] I was struck by the fact that in 1955 and 1959 more people seemed to stress the high prestige of the community president than they had done in 1953. This impression, if fully verified, would indicate a growing importance of and a re-emphasis upon local government in the Greek scheme of things. One priest in the Peloponnesos attributed this shift to the fact that "interest in religion is not as great as twenty years ago and church attendance has declined." A few typical replies, many contradicting each other in some details, will convey the villager's view of the notables in his community. From Central Greece:

554
875
759
622
793 The greatest honor in our village is to be president of the community. Those who are most respected are those with the most money. Anyone who has money receives a hearty "good morning"; without money he doesn't. This is because our people are not educated. In fact, the priest gets more respect than the teacher, which is not as it should be. The local doctor, too, is respected.

From another village in Central Greece we hear:

The most important people are the most educated, either the doctor or the teacher who, thanks to his education, can solve a problem in which the people are interested. We have some clever people who try to overshadow the teacher in order to influence other villagers, but if they are to do this they must be respected. If an extremely clever person is immoral, he has no great prestige. Two things influence other people: to be just in his judgment and honorable. We respect a man more if he is honorable than if he is rich. Even an uneducated man who is a good farmer and has good judgment and is honorable can have influence.

• [665] Party leaders in former times would have been included among the notables, according to a businessman from Thebes:

In my childhood days the party leader would have ranked as most important, particularly if he belonged to the strongest party and would be able to help local people solve their problems. Nowadays in the village the president of the community would play a great part. The doctor, if there is one, has high position, provided that he is respected by the others. In the old days the priest and teacher were more respected than today. In my childhood when the teacher

575
[474] For men, the cooperatives are the chief associations, although meetings are relatively infrequent since these are primarily service organizations. They have not yet really taken on the educational role displayed by the youth or women's groups.

575
571 At best, these organizations which have been described exist to satisfy the interests of the members who affiliate. Unlike the institutionalized church board, school board, and community council, they do not exist to serve community-wide needs even though many of their stated purposes might contain grandiose aims. Most of these are not organizations which the villagers themselves have created, but have been formed in response to outside pressures and have been founded in the hope that they will do something to help the villagers have a better life. What makes the promotion of such organizations difficult is the utter lack on the part of the peasant of an abstract loyalty to an organization; he goes if he wants to or if he likes the agent from outside — not because he feels it his duty as a member to support the group of which he is a part.

Even if the numbers of organizations in rural Greece were doubled and the membership quadrupled, it is hardly likely that the Greek peasant would think of the "organizational approach" to problem solving. Where some Americans might get together and form a group to deal with a problem, the Greek peasants would either say "let the central government do it" or, if they are more sophisticated, relegate it to the community council to worry about. There is no tie-in between individual responsibility and membership-in-action groups, such as one finds in suburban America; the peasant is in the preorganization stage, which perhaps indicates why his life seems so untrammelled to those who get to know him well.

THE SENSE OF COMMUNITY

621
182 Greek village life has a unity in the sense that the peasants see their life as a whole and do not compartmentalize it in the way that it has been presented here. They make no distinction between religion and agriculture, family life and recreation, mutual aid and local government. Life flows on day by day, each day with its own tasks and joys, but marked by the variations which the seasons bring. Nor does the Greek villager distinguish in his mind among his village as a place or physical setting, his home, or the people who walk the streets. All these, to which we might also add the donkeys, goats, and other animals, possess a unity in that they fit together as a part of his accustomed world.

621
578
●665 But Greek village life does not have a unity in the sense that there is perfect agreement within the community on every course of action or in the sense that people placidly sit by and concur in what a few self-appointed leaders might choose to do. Factions arise, and many of them persist. These can arise in time of war when rival armies visit the village in the search

669
182

The Village Community

283 182

for enemy sympathizers, thus presenting a wonderful chance for the unscrupulous person to denounce a fellow villager with whom he wants to even an old score. In the choice of sides in the Communist-inspired guerrilla war, for example, definite factions came into existence and their lines have not been altogether obliterated today.

Despite factionalism and the lack of idyllic harmony, it is correct to say that most villagers feel a sense of community. It may seem entirely absent whenever people are trying to persuade the villagers to carry out community improvements from which they can see no immediate benefit, but it is there to be reckoned with whenever the reputation or the safety of the community is threatened. To try to explain the basis for this sense of community is to review much of what has already been said, but perhaps it can be understood in terms of four divergent strands: *philotimo*, or ultra-sensitive self-esteem; a common living space; shared institutions; and an accepted system of social control.

Philotimo. Social phenomena in Greece must be seen first in terms of individuals, who in turn cannot be understood without recognizing the national trait of *philotimo*. Dorothy Lee has clearly explained this complex character trait:

Everyone has his *philotimo*, as an individual, as a member of a family, and, most of all, as a Greek. On this rests Greek individualism, since it is sheer being which is respected, not position in the world or achievement. On this rests Greek democracy and equality, since everyone, both as a person and as a Greek, is equal to everyone else, neither superior nor inferior. . . . This does not mean that there is lacking a balance of roles or interpersonal structuring; but these relationships of interdependence, of leader and followers, of division of areas of responsibility and work are not cast in the mold of superiority and inferiority. Inferiority comes only with the forfeiting of the *philotimo*. . . . The inner core of the Greek must never be exposed; and *entrope*, the Greek word for shame, modesty, decency, propriety, self-consciousness, embarrassment, means: "turning inward." This is a concept both positive and negative: you have done something shameful only because you have failed in the positive aspect, in modesty and decency. Out of *entrope* a Greek avoids saying things and doing things which would reflect on the *philotimo* of himself, his family, his country. For example, the self-made man in Greece does not boast of his rags-to-riches progress. This would expose the poverty of his village, the inability of his family to help him, the fact that his uncle or his godfather could not or did not do his duty by him; it would expose much that should remain decently covered, and would further prove him to be lacking in *philotimo*.⁹

Dr. Lee then goes on to explain that the essence of *philotimo* is inviolability and freedom and that the sense of inviolability makes a Greek extremely "touchy." An offended *philotimo* leads to retaliation, not self-reproach. She writes:

621
[578]
665
669

156
828
577
182

[571]

Social Consequences of Foreign Aid

311

or if plowing and other operations can be performed on contract. In any event, the introduction of the type of machinery which reduces labor requirements is apt to send people off the farm, whether from the family acquiring the tractor or the poorer farmers who rent their land to a machine owner looking for a larger area to farm. 178
241
184
[464]

Another feature mentioned by Mosher is a further distinguishing trait between the peasant and the farmer: namely, the greater dependence of the farmer upon the town. The peasant makes occasional trips to a market town, often as much for the excitement of a change as for the economic benefits he derives. If it were necessary, he could postpone such trips almost indefinitely, particularly if there were other villagers who would buy his surplus crop or a calf or who would purchase for him some necessities from outside. But the man with a machine of a complex sort is dependent upon the repair shops of the town; moreover, he has bought the machine there and is financially tied to the town. To the extent that his children pursue a secondary education, he also develops interests in the center where the school is located. If good roads are built, and automobiles or cheap bus transportation become available, he may even seek recreational outlets in the town. 178
184
369
[445]

As the rural people become familiar with town ways, they shift from peasant dress to the more uniform and less colorful urban clothes. It is no longer possible to look at a Greek farmer in town and tell what village or immediate area he is from by the characteristics of his costume; he becomes anonymous and nondescript, indicating the beginning or even culmination of a psychological break with peasant life. Money which would have formerly been spent in other ways now goes for modern goods and garments; more cash becomes necessary to maintain the changing standard of living, and alternative sources of employment have to be found to supplement the income from the farm. [291]

This increased exposure to town usually carries with it heightened exposure to various communication media. In the past, the village has been the peasant's universe; the main currents of city or national life passed him by. But as he becomes a farmer, he visits the supply store in town to hear about prices, new fertilizers, new types of seeds, new insecticides. At the same time, he hears about many other things going on in the world. With the coming of radio to his village, and the occasional newspaper, his distance from town is minimized, but learning from these sources is not quite the same as talking to individuals in the town who claim "to be in the know," whether as well-informed officials or individuals recently returned from the capital city. He also brings back some reading material to ponder over when work is slack. His former mental isolation breaks down. 178
184
369
[20]

Such exposure to town influences, along with whatever he learns about government agricultural policies, increasingly involves the peasant in politi- 665
829

178 cal life. Traditionally, the peasant was interested in visible benefits from
184 the government: a bridge, an all-weather road, a new school building, a
369 better priest, or a drainage project. But the farmer moves in his thinking
665 from concentration on single projects to the more confused level of gov-
829 ernmental policies. He has learned that such policies affect him just as
definitely as some local measure, and he reacts accordingly. In some coun-
tries, peasant parties arise, chiefly under the instigation and leadership of
urban intellectuals who see a discontented segment to weld into a political
force. Such movements help transform the apolitical peasant into a partisan,
a condition which increases his acceptance of the traits of the modern
farmer.

184 One could continue the listing of these traits, one set characterizing the
178 peasant at one extreme and the commercial farmer at the other extreme.
82 Perhaps it will suffice to conclude with a brief examination of some of the
less tangible and noneconomic consequences of shifting from a peasant to
a farmer.

The first of these is a new attitude toward nature. The peasant, depend-
ing upon the philosophical tradition of which he is a part, may submit and
resign himself to the vagaries of nature, or he may actively adjust, fighting
flood and drought as best he can. With the technology available to him,
however, he is at a great disadvantage. The farmer, on the other hand, has
moved toward an attitude of mastery over nature, although he never com-
pletely approaches this. It is more than a partnership since the farmer is
constantly trying to do something to nature: fertilize the soil, put up trees
as shelter belts, tile a field to give proper drainage, spray crops to kill in-
sects and eliminate plant disease, and apply contour plowing.

178 A second subtle, though no less real, attitudinal change deals with the
184 growth of individualism. This occurs as the young people tend to liberate
156 themselves, in some ways at least, from the authority of their parents. They
begin to express their own personalities, to stand on their own feet, not as
a reflection of a family group but as individuals in their own right. It also
means that a farmer, in determining a new course of action, is much less
inclined than the peasant to wonder what the neighbors would think; in-
stead, he tries to calculate the economic return, the saving in labor, or the
greater productivity. Peasants know that if they depart too far from the
accepted practice, they are considered disruptive and may wake up one
morning to find their haystack burned down as a sign that they had better
conform. The open-field system and communal nature of much of peasant
life leaves little room for too many exceptions to the general rule. On the
other hand, when local villagers have been persuaded that a new practice
is desirable, it can be carried out much more quickly and effectively than
if every family head had to be contacted as a separate individual. The in-
formal channels of communication in a village are amazingly fast and,

Social Consequences of Foreign Aid

317

bound by any loyalty greater than that to their family and their village. Whether through a highly virulent nationalism or a growing sense of participation in a multinational state, the individual — to change from a subject to a citizen — must expand his circle of loyalties to encompass the larger political unit of which he supposedly is a first-class citizen. 641

A second condition, tied in with the first, is the growing sense on the part of the villager that the central government is concerned with his welfare. Without this, the necessary loyalty will not develop. Villagers need both physical manifestations of governmental activity in their behalf (new schools, roads, bridges) and expanding economic opportunities. To some extent, foreign-aid programs can help in this area, particularly in seeing that the benefits are not all concentrated in the cities and mushrooming towns but that even remote sections gain some sense of benefit.

A third corollary is the necessity for widespread education. In the developing countries, the young people with the most education are often viewed as the troublemakers, so much so that some observers may even question the assumption that stable democratic government depends on a highly literate and educated electorate and point out that some of the most educated people, such as the Germans, have moved on occasion wholeheartedly into totalitarianism. They argue that a little education is a dangerous thing politically. But it seems clear that the alternative of holding back educational programs is fraught with even more political danger if truly democratic regimes are to become established. Since every regime has to think about ways and means of staying in power, it is all too tempting to promote only that kind of education which most benefits the regime and to forget future needs. Studies of the experiences of many new nations would probably show that education and economic opportunity need to go hand in hand if serious dislocations are to be avoided. Increased income among the uneducated is socially unproductive, and an educated segment with no suitable employment possibilities leads to political discontent. It is also true that a people lacking the basic reading and mathematical skills cannot achieve modern economic development. Thus, if a subject is to become a citizen, he needs to receive an education that fits him not only to perform as an economic producer but also to play his part in the political process.

Since democratic governments depend upon active political organizations — such as parties — the villager must learn how to participate in formal organizations. As pointed out in Chapter 10, the Greek villager does not think in terms of formal organizations to the same extent as the Western European or American. He uses the direct personal approach rather than relying upon organized joint action to gain his goals. In this sense, the rural Greek is much like villagers throughout the world. To take part in a democratic government, therefore, he must gain experience in [665]•

The Village: As a Community

The Village Government

621 IN THE FIRST CHAPTER the village was described as a setting for the life of families, which are the most significant social groups in the settlement. It now becomes possible to consider the functions of the village itself as an entity in its own right. First, the formal organization of village-wide activities and responsibilities will be discussed, and second, the attitudes of the inhabitants toward Vasilika in contrast with their attitudes toward the family and the nation.

[631] The Greek government classifies Vasilika as a *kinotis* for administrative purposes despite its small population. A *kinotis* is legally a populated center with at least 300 inhabitants and a school, and constitutes one of the four kinds of administrative subdivisions in each of the *nomes* (provinces) of Greece.

622 The formal governmental activities of the *kinotis* are the responsibility of
623 a locally elected president and council. A community the size of Vasilika is
665 entitled to a council of five members elected for a four-year term. Voting must
666 be done along party lines; and voters select five names from among those listed
by the party of their choice. Vasilika had only two political parties in its local
elections in 1956. Under the system of proportional representation then operating,
the four men with the most votes from the party which itself had the majority
of votes were elected to the council. The fifth member should have been the man
with the most votes in the minority party. At the last Vasilika election, however,
the man in this position preferred not to act as a minority representative and the
second man on the list became the council member. The five representatives then elect
a president and a vice-president from among their number, usually for two-year terms.
The council and community are served by an additional official, the secretary of the *kinotis*.

624 The secretary is not elected and has no
[634] vote on the council. He is appointed by the *nomarch* (governor) of the province
upon nomination from the village council. His salary varies with the income of

[Public Life in 1947]

24

COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

669 sure that aid would come, or if it came that it would arrive soon
648 enough and in large enough quantity to turn the tide. Yet for-
433 eign aid was clearly needed if the Communist guerrillas were
to be stopped. Without it, the government could scarcely hope
to maintain its army for long. More than that, the fabric of the
civil economy could not stand by itself, especially when guer-
rilla raids and road mines made transport and communication
unsafe.

727 Apart from the military and diplomatic aspects, there was
648 another and more fundamental sense in which the morale of
the government and of the conservative classes was damaged.
The general ideas and presuppositions of the non-Communist
politicians and their supporters were badly shaken by the course
of events in the immediate postwar period. Their general as-
sumption had been that once the Germans had withdrawn and
a transition period of special emergency had been passed
through, then the society and economy of Greece would return
of themselves to something like stability and the prewar pat-
tern. Yet now the Germans had departed, UNRRA had come
and gone (save for a small rear guard), and still there was no
stability and no security. Far less was there any prospect of
prosperity.

[661] The upheaval of the war years had in fact been too drastic
to permit any automatic return to normal. But the political lead-
ers of the country, all of whom had grown up in a world where
government economic policy and administration were con-
ceived in terms of doing favors for one's friends and withhold-
ing them from one's opponents, had no idea how to cope with
the disturbed and unhappy society entrusted to their guidance.
No idea, that is, except to ask for help from Britain or the
United States.

● [662] The politicians could scarcely be accused of not having done
their part to bring things back to normal. During the brief res-

6: McNeill H-5 (1947, 1956) 1957

EH1 Greece EH1

[Public Life in 1947]

COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

25

pite between the time when British troops had suppressed the wartime guerrilla army in December 1944, and the resumption of the guerrilla war in the summer of 1946, the politicians resumed the prewar game of politics with an exemplary faithfulness to old customs and methods. Two of the principal figures of Greek politics, Sophocles Venizelos and Constantine Tsaldaris, carried family names that had been illustrious in the twenties and thirties, and owed their leadership more to their names than to any personal attributes. Quarrels between royalists and republicans, which dated back to the first world war, remained the principal line of demarcation between rival groups of politicians; and demands for territorial expansion at the expense of the defeated powers — primarily Bulgaria — remained a major stock-in-trade of political oratory, and the best antidote the political leaders could find for the discontent and unrest of the nation. This, after all, had been the dominant theme in the career of the great Eleftherios Venizelos, who had almost doubled Greek territory between 1912 and 1919, and even for a dizzy moment seemed to have the old Byzantine capital of Constantinople within his grasp. And how could any politician hope to improve on Venizelist models?

Fame and fortune had always been the stuff and substance of a political career; special favors to friends and supporters had always been the means by which power was sustained; parties had always been fragile coalitions of ambitious public men who combined for a longer or shorter time under the leadership of one of their number, only to scatter and re-form in some new constellation when the restless striving for place and position dictated a change.

To be sure, even before the war, extensive social legislation had been enacted, and the idea that the government was somehow responsible for maintaining the welfare of the population at large was not unknown. But such measures were conceived

727

665

648

665

661

727

661

433

[Public Life in 1947]

26

COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

727 primarily as electoral maneuvers, aimed to win votes, rather
 661 than as aspects of any general social policy. A managed econ-
 433 omy, or even a semi-managed economy, in which government
 decisions influenced the flow and volume of investment, regu-
 lated the supply of money, and adjusted the share of the na-
 tional income to be enjoyed by different groups in the popula-
 tion was scarcely within the purview of the old-style politicians.
 Once again, this was not because the government had not inter-
 vened repeatedly and with telling effect in the economic life of
 the country. It had, but usually in the spirit of helping political
 or personal friends and thwarting foes.

Yet in spite of the faithful and unimaginative efforts of the
 political cosmos (the name Greeks give to the small number of
 men who play leading roles in political life) to return to a com-
 fortable prewar pattern of behavior, the country ungratefully
 failed to follow suit. The times remained desperately out of
 joint, but knowing no way to set them right, the conservative
 politicians and their supporters were in a quandary. Their mo-
 rale was destroyed by the lack of any clearly defined and firmly
 felt purpose and program, quite as much as by the diplomatic
 and material difficulties they confronted. Among the men of the
 right, apathy and hopelessness alternated with sporadic anti-
 Communist and extra-legal violence; but neither the one nor
 the other seemed to do anything but make the situation worse.

665 The Greek Communist party was not without its own internal
 727 difficulties, but by comparison with the old-style politicians the
 Communists had tremendous advantages. First and foremost,
 they commanded a disciplined, enthusiastic and energetic body
 of committed followers, men who could be counted upon to fol-
 low instructions and who were willing to undergo personal
 hardship in the service of their dream for the future. Beyond
 this, the Communists enjoyed the sympathy or admiration of a

6: McNeill H-5 (1947, 1956) 1957

EH1 Greece EH1

[Public Life in 1947]

COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

27

considerable proportion of the population, especially among the workmen of the towns and the peasants of the hill villages. No one can say how large this group was, but to estimate it at about 20 per cent of the nation's total population is a reasonable guess. 665 ● 727

Another important asset of the Communists was their war-time record as leaders of resistance against the Germans and Italians. They could plausibly paint themselves as true champions of Greek national freedom and of democracy, while accusing their opponents of betraying the interests of the nation first to the Axis and then to the British. To be both a patriot and a Communist sympathizer did not therefore seem incompatible. [726]

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the Communists did have a more or less definite program of action and knew what they wanted. They were able to explain the continued distress of the country as a natural result of the creeping crisis of capitalism. They had a ready cure at hand in the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, as a preliminary to planned industrial expansion, on the Russian model. To many Communist followers, no doubt, the program meant little more than an angry intention to take from the rich and give to the poor, i.e., to themselves, all the good things which had selfishly and unjustly been withheld from them. Others, more sophisticated, realized that there would inevitably be a long period of time when suffering and poverty still would prevail, but believed that in the long run the dream of abundance for all could be realized, if the government planned economic activity and compelled sufficient investment. And no matter what the degree of economic understanding among their followers, the Communists had the advantage of offering the distressed and confused a cause to which to dedicate themselves, an enemy against

[Public Life in 1947]

28

COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

665 whom to fight, and a hope for the future. None of the old-line
727 political parties or leaders could do any of these things nearly
so effectively.

665 Only the inner circle of the Greek Communist party was di-
669 rectly affected by the very real fissure between what may be
called "home grown" and "Russian" Communists. The rank and
file of party members and sympathizers were perhaps scarcely
aware of any such tensions, and accepted without any special
notice the transfer of authority over the Greek Communist party
from the hands of George Siantos, who had led it during the
war years, to those of Nicholas Zachariades, who had spent the
war in a German concentration camp. Yet this shift, accom-
plished in May 1945, represented the assertion of control by
leaders trained and directed by Moscow, as against the more
independent "home grown" leadership which Siantos had em-
bodied.

In any case, this fissure was only of potential importance. If
Russian policy should diverge seriously from lines acceptable
to "home grown" Communists, then the factions in the Greek
Communist party might be expected to come into the open. So
long as no such divergence appeared – and in 1946 and 1947
it did not – the only consequence was to elevate some persons
to positions of authority in the party and to blight the careers
of others who had thrown in their lot with the defeated side.

665 Hence, in 1946 and 1947 the advantages enjoyed by the Greek
669 Communist party in competition with its rivals were actual, its
648 weaknesses only potential. This was true not only within the
727 country; but internationally as well. The Communist countries
to the north began actively assisting the Greek Communist
bands, sending arms and ammunition, allowing hard-pressed
units to find refuge across the border, and providing hospital
and other services to them as far as geographical difficulties
permitted. On the other hand, British military and economic

6: McNeill H-5 (1947, 1956) 1957

EH1 Greece EH1

[Public Life in 1947]

COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

29

support for the Greek government was about to be withdrawn, and it was not yet clear that American support would be forthcoming to replace the British. Under the circumstances it is not strange that the Communists went from strength to strength, while their opponents were filled with foreboding for the future.

665
669
648
727

To be sure, the Communists faced one great obstacle. Their opponents were still in full control of the administrative machine of government. The pattern so successfully followed in eastern European countries which fell within the Russian sphere of influence, whereby Communists first acquired a toehold in the administration and then used their position to push all rivals out, could scarcely be employed in Greece. The police, army and civil bureaucracy were all firmly in anti-Communist hands. British armed intervention in 1944 had been necessary to secure this state of affairs, but it was confirmed by elections held in 1946; and the new aggressiveness of international Communist policies did not permit patient waiting until some future election might lead to a coalition including Communist ministers.

669
647

[648]
[666]

Yet the effectiveness of these instruments of power was sadly blunted in Greece. In the countryside the police were too few to resist concerted attack by guerrilla bands. The army was numerous enough, but the morale of the soldiers made offensive actions against the guerrillas difficult and largely ineffective.

The civil bureaucracy was distinguished by its clumsiness and occasional corruption. Efforts to prevent corruption led to excessive centralization, so that even simple decisions had constantly to be referred to Athens, and not infrequently to a cabinet member, before action could be taken. The nomarchs,

647
661

the principal local officials in the provinces, characteristically spent more time in Athens, haunting the central offices of the government in hope of getting needed decisions, money or supplies, than they did in the districts assigned to them. Incidentally, of course, they could thereby consolidate personal rela-

[634]

x 178 established a sort of colony of its own. Girls have been left behind, to pine as old maids, or else to marry some boy from one of the even poorer villages high in the hills — boys who are prepared to come down and cultivate the olive trees belonging to the families of the absent young men in return for a share of the crop.

166
[369]
[427] 647 One of the grievances that other Greeks have against the Maniotes (as people from Mani are called), and against the Peloponnesians in general, is that they dominate the civil service of the country. There is some truth in this complaint. The

• [665] population of these parts has never quarreled with the powers that be; the people are nearly all royalist and conservative. And [186] they cultivate, to a degree remarkable even among the Greeks, a clannishness which leads them to help one another as against

[625] natives of other parts of Greece. The gendarmerie, for example, is recruited in disproportionate part from among Maniotes, and the same is true of several other branches of the governmental service. It is, therefore, a bit easier for a person from this section to get a government job than it would be for a man from another part of the country. Villages like Yerolimini make the most of this fact. It looks as though Kardamili, a bit belatedly, is attempting to do the same. But one cannot help wondering what will happen when the graduates of Kardamili and Nea Eleftherohori and of hundreds of similar villages begin to compete for positions in the government. There can hardly be room for them all.

x 178 If these six villages were well chosen, if their reactions to the difficulties of the last few years in Greece represent widespread phenomena and not merely local idiosyncracies, then it seems clear that neither American nor Greek official policy has been able to do much to solve the problems of the hill villages. If a peaceable solution is to come, it seems probable that it will

433

The Political Cosmos

However real the changes which had come in the senior ranks of the civil service and in local government, it remained true that plans for economic development and for most local improvements depended ultimately upon cabinet ministers who held office as politicians and not as economic or any other sort of technicians. Cabinet ministers in turn held their high positions at the pleasure of parliamentary deputies, whose votes depended partly on party affiliations, partly on personal ambition, and partly on calculations of the state of opinion among the electorate. 645
646
433
663

As in other countries where a managerial bureaucracy does not enjoy unchallenged control of the governmental machine, the issues that have most excited the politicians and the public in Greece have not been questions of economic policy and priority. Everyone is in favor of economic development, everyone is against inflation; everyone is in favor of better salaries and pensions, and everyone is against an unbalanced budget. In other words, political debate is not carried on in responsible economic terms, and a government in office always finds it impossible to live up to wild promises its leaders made in campaign speeches. 666
433
663

This sort of irresponsibility is by no means peculiar to Greece. Most politicians in democratic countries, not least in the United States, behave very similarly. What lends the Greek political world its peculiar character is the nature of the political parties and the irredentist tradition of Greek nationalism. 665 •
[563]
[619]
[648]

Political parties in Greece (with the exception of the Communist party) formed in the past around the person of a political leader rather than around a program or around local political machines. The system worked effectively only when an unusually gifted individual appeared on the scene, who, by the

665 magnetism of his personality, was able to control his followers and keep them faithful to him. Eleftherios Venizelos was able to exert such leadership during parts of his career, though even he was not always successful. General Papagos achieved something similar during the first year or so when he held office, before his failing health raised the question of the succession and induced his followers to start jockeying for position.

645 When no single commanding figure was able to dominate the political scene— and this was normal — then political life became a complicated intrigue among ambitious individuals. 662 Every cabinet spent a lot of energy smoothing over personal frictions within its own ranks, and attempting to block schemes, originating from the outside, to disrupt its following in the Chamber of Deputies. In many instances, these preoccupations [433] prevented the cabinet from paying more than casual attention [663] to the really important issues confronting Greece: questions of economic policy, in particular, were often neglected, and awkward decisions, bound to disappoint powerful individuals, were sometimes put off indefinitely.

665 The introduction of the majority system of election in 1952 was conceived, both by its Greek advocates and by the United 666 States Embassy, as a promising remedy for this situation. The 645 effect of the new electoral law was to compel separate personal [177] parties to form election coalitions, since without a coalition no party could hope for a majority if any two others joined forces. But the coalitions did not really destroy the personal parties. Instead, the leaders forming a coalition bargained together to decide how many personal supporters each would be allowed to insert in the coalition's slate of candidates. Questions of the apportionment of cabinet positions and other honorific appointments, to be awarded in the event of victory, were also explored if not always settled in advance. To be sure, Papagos resisted this process and made few promises to the politicians who

PUBLIC LIFE

187

joined his Rally; yet even he, when it came to appointing his cabinet, rewarded the most conspicuous leaders of personal parties who had merged their following into his, by appointing them to ministerial positions. 665
666
645

By 1956, when the commanding personality of General Papagos had been removed from the scene, the actual differences made by the new electoral law were a good deal less marked than might at first appear. Under the old proportional electoral system, the critical negotiations to form a cabinet occurred after the elections; under the new majority system very similar negotiations preceded the elections. In either case, personal followings gathered around a specially conspicuous individual were the basic elements from which cabinets and coalitions were built. Even these building blocks of the political edifice were not very firm; a leader might find, almost overnight, that "his" followers had gone off after someone else who seemed to promise something new or different.

How a man became a party leader was hard to say. Very diverse personalities were active in Greek politics, and some party leaders seemed, at least from the outside, to have little personal impressiveness. Inheritance was a factor in some cases. Sophocles Venizelos, for example, had made his political career on the strength of his father's name, and on little else. Men who lacked such an advantage normally established leadership by oratory in the Chamber of Deputies and through newspaper publicity. 665
645
662

As the game of politics was played, the opposition regularly enjoyed certain advantages. This implied a degree of instability for any government. First of all, in any distribution of ministerial seats and other plums of office, more contenders were bound to be left out than could possibly be included. Efforts to solve this difficulty by enlarging the size of the cabinet have been made from time to time, but always at the cost of effi-

● 665 ciency, since the more voices that have to reach agreement
645 upon any policy, the more difficult it is to decide anything.
662 Hence the size of Greek cabinets has fluctuated very markedly
since World War II, from over twenty-five to less than fifteen
members. But even when a cabinet was made unwieldy by the
effort to include as many potential supporters as possible, there
were always more disappointed than successful candidates; and
to such discontented persons it was a standing temptation to
break party lines and vote the government down in the Cham-
ber of Deputies on any convenient issue. In the ensuing cabinet
reshuffle they might always hope to do better, having proved
their indispensability to the government by unseating it.

665 Second, the opposition was always in the position of being
666 able to criticize without suggesting specific and practicable al-
ternatives. It was easy to denounce half measures, to attack
policies limited by the availability of money or of physical re-
sources, to criticize the gaps between promises and actual
achievements. The fact that much of what was thus attacked
could not have been done much differently by anyone in power
made little difference, since the opposition was not seriously
concerned with what could or could not be done. Most politi-
cians out of office were inclined to feel that any stick with
which to beat the government, even a rotten one, was better
than silence, so long as the stick hurt.

[663] The irrelevance of much of the language of political debate
to the real, underlying problems of Greek society was easy to
criticize from the outside. Yet a sober technical discussion of
what the government could and should accomplish, of relative
priority among the many desirable projects, and of long-range
policies calculated to relieve overpopulation and underemploy-
ment lacked all political appeal.

471 The difficulty was that Greece faced a formidable political-
457 psychological problem. If large-scale investment on the basis

648

663

190]

TITO AND GOLIATH

Y
148
B
648

Pirin district; but it was most unsatisfactory to Sofia, and the whole controversial question was in fact still open when the Cominform resolution of June 1948 ended all prospect of friendship, let alone of federation. The discussion of the proposal for federation actually contributed, as we shall see in the next chapter, to Moscow's growing mistrust of Tito and hence to the final break.

Even after Stalin had lost Tito as an ally he found difficulty in exploiting the Macedonian question profitably in Soviet propaganda. The natural course would have been to come out openly for transferring control over Yugoslav Macedonia from the new enemies in Belgrade to the eager sycophants in Sofia. But to indicate that Tito's fall would produce this result would have strengthened his régime and ended the hope of Cominform forces overturning it from within. The best that Moscow could do was to permit the revival of Bulgarian propaganda for the creation of a separate Macedonian republic, in the name of Macedonian nationalism, but to take no part in it officially.

6
665

Even this limited Bulgarian propaganda complicated things for the Greek Communists. The Greek people suspected one wing of the Greek Communist Party of being willing to contribute Greek territory to bring a separate Macedonian state into existence. The suspicion had been strengthened by a story that one of the old-line Greek Communists, Yannis Ioannides, had agreed in July 1943 with a Bulgarian Communist named Dushan Daskalov to carve a Macedonian state out of Greek, Bulgarian and Yugoslav territory after the war and incorporate it directly into the Soviet Union. The plan as reported was grandiose; apparently Turkey was to be deprived of Istanbul, which was to be included in the Macedonian Soviet Socialist Republic along with Salonika. Russia would at last control the Straits and dominate the Aegean. When the American intelligence first got wind of the story it assumed that it had been planted by Nazi propagandists; but then it learnt that Ioannides had visited Moscow just before his meeting with Daskalov, and other bits of corroborative evidence indicated the probability that the Soviets actually were setting up an alternative design for use in the event that Tito proved troublesome or Bulgaria in some manner escaped the Soviet net. True or not, the story aided the Greek anti-Com-

¹
a [i.e. Bulgarian propaganda for the creation of a separate Macedonian republic. --- Analyst]

MACEDONIA: OLD STRUGGLES IN NEW DISGUISES

[191

munists by raising popular fears that a Soviet-dominated régime might partition Greece.

To add one more convolution to the involved situation, a strong element among the Greek Communists had always hoped to bring Communist Greece into a federation of East European Communist states—precisely the sort of federation which Russia was determined never to tolerate lest it limit her own control of the area.⁸ By something more than a coincidence, the announcement that a "Free Greek Government" was to be established by the Greek Communists had occurred at about the same time that Tito and Dimitrov were meeting at Bled; and it also is significant that when such a government actually was set up in December 1947, with General Markos Vafiades as a principal leader, it was not accorded recognition by the Soviet Union or any of the satellites. Whether other satellite leaders were involved in the project, Gomulka in Poland, for example, or Clementis in Czechoslovakia, is not known. But the signs that Markos was suspect in Moscow from then on are unmistakable.

Tito's expulsion from the Cominform faced Soviet policy-makers with a hard choice in Greece. Tito had been an indispensable middleman in transporting Soviet help to the Greek rebels and their most active supporter on his own account. Soviet military equipment and arms went to the rebel bands over Yugoslav railways and Yugoslav food and uniforms nourished and clothed them. When the mountain fighters found themselves in a tight corner the Yugoslav frontiers always were open to them, their wounded were succored and cared for in Yugoslav hospitals, reinforcements were trained in Yugoslav camps and the Greek children whom they evacuated (or kidnapped) on their retreats found homes in Yugoslav institutions. Neither of Greece's other satellite neighbors, Bulgaria and Albania, was so well situated geographically to provide this help. Besides, all Greeks, including Communists, had hateful memories of wartime experiences in Albania and under the Bulgarian occupation of Greek Macedonia; and these memories would not down despite the ideological affinities existing between the Greek guerrillas and the Com-

⁸ *Pravda* in January 1948 condemned the idea of a "Balkan or Danubian federation including Poland, Czechoslovakia and Greece." (my italics) and forced Dimitrov to disown it (cf. Chapter XVII).

192]

TITO AND GOLIATH

Y
648
G
● 665
munist régimes now installed in Sofia and Tirana. No such memories troubled the relations of Greek and Yugoslav Communists. But now the Yugoslav Partisan leader who had been extolled among Greek Communists not only for his outstanding Communist zeal but as the closest and most helpful of allies was suddenly declared an enemy of all true Communists and the Greek rebel bands were ordered to cease traffic with him.

G
665
The conflict between the call of warfare in the Greek mountains as heard by the guerrillas directly and the call of international revolutionary tactics as relayed from Moscow split the Greek Communists. In the ensuing confusion the Greek guerrilla chieftain, General Markos Vafiades, disappeared from view. After his absence had been noted for some time both in Greece and abroad, the Greek rebel radio simply announced, early in February 1949, that he had been superseded. But soon afterwards it admitted that the Greek Communist Party had been purging itself of "opportunists" and "national deviationists" and was now being reorganized on stricter "monolithic" lines. Evidently Titoism had an appeal for some of the Greek mountain fighters, and evidently Markos was one of them.

The man chosen to succeed him was the same Ioannides who reportedly had been ready to sacrifice Salonika and the rest of Greek Macedonia in 1943. Markos and other nationalistically inclined Rightists having been purged or cowed, and with Moscow's unquestioning servants in charge, the "People's Liberation Front" adopted a propaganda line like the Bulgarian and called for "the union of Macedonia as an independent equal state in a confederation of Balkan peoples" (February 27, 1949). In March, Nicolas Zachariades, the Secretary-General of the Party, and Constantin Karageorgis, commanding the guerrillas in the Peloponnesos, attended a meeting in the mountains of northwest Greece described by the rebel radio as concerned principally with building a "Front of Macedonian National Liberation." All Macedonians—Greek, Yugoslav, Bulgarian, Albanian and Turk—were to be brought into an "autonomous" state under Cominform auspices. The composition of the new rebel "government" announced in April confirmed the trend: it contained two non-Greeks described as "Slav-Macedonians."

196]

TITO AND GOLIATH

066 which to receive Western war materials and the Greeks would be as exposed to the new invaders as they were to the Nazis.

It was a bitter decision for the Russians to end the Greek civil war, but they saw the risks of any other course. One factor was the growing strength of the Greek Army. Following accepted international practice, the United States had supplied the legal Greek Government with arms. As a result, the armies taking the field in 1949 were well equipped and had good morale. Another influential factor was that the United Nations Commission had kept world opinion posted about the aid reaching the rebels from Communist sources abroad. Thirdly, now that Yugoslav railways could no longer be used, the best overland line for Soviet shipments via Bulgaria was cut. In future, Russian help could not be so easily disguised, would involve Soviet prestige directly and hence if supplied at all would have to be supplied on a scale to be decisive. This would amount to open intervention and involved the risk of general war.

•665 In the spring of 1949 the Communist and fellow-traveller press
648 of the world had still been talking bravely of certain victory for the Greek "democrats." "The Monarchists could never repeat the scale of their offensive in Grammos last summer," and "this year will mark the turning point in the task of liberating Greece."⁵ But after General Papagos's victories at Vitsi and Grammos that summer the Russian decision to liquidate the civil war became final. On October 9 the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party accepted defeat. It held that the hopes of the year before had been correct, "under the conditions when the Tito clique had not yet openly gone over to the imperialist camp and pretended to be a friend of the Greek democratic movement." Now, however, the Yugoslavs had "stabbed the Democratic Army in the back" and the military struggle had to cease.⁶ The rebel radio broadcast the news on November 4, summarizing the reasons as follows: "Tito's treachery; the exploitation of this treachery by the Americans; the latter's growing determination to hold their bridgehead in Greece;

⁵ *The New Central European Observer*, London, April 30, 1949.

⁶ *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Bucharest, November 18, 1949.

GREECE EHI
CUBA EHI

MACEDONIA: OLD STRUGGLES IN NEW DISGUISES

[197

increased U.S. aid to Monarcho-Fascism; and so forth." The Party line, the radio added, was formally changed. Henceforth the emphasis would be on "the organization and leadership of the political and economic struggles of all the strata of the working people—above all, the working class and employees, the displaced peasants, the hundreds of thousands of wounded, the war victims, the women and the youth."

The admission that Greek nationalism had won a military victory and that Greek Communism must try to regain its hold on the masses by returning to the first principles of social action did not mean, of course, that propaganda warfare or even terroristic acts had to cease. Soon Nicolas Zachariades was writing in the Cominform journal that the American aim of creating a "Belgrade-Athens axis" must be fought "concretely, daily, constantly and tirelessly." As an example of what he meant he suggested sabotage of Yugoslav railway lines. But nothing could hide the fact that once again the feud with Belgrade had damaged Soviet Russia. It had drawn attention to the difference between her interests and those of her satellites. It had split the Greek Communist forces. It had helped the Truman Doctrine achieve its purpose sooner than might otherwise have happened.

In the autumn of 1950 as so often in the past Russia faced the old dilemma that if she favored one Balkan nation too openly she would outrage the others. The Soviet leaders now were aware, too, that when they spoke of a nation they could not exclude the Communists in it: Tito had added a complication to the Soviet game instead of simplifying it. The temptation to set the Bulgars loose against Tito must nevertheless have been very strong. The Bulgarian Army was newly equipped with Russian arms and had been reorganized by the new Minister of Defense, Lieutenant-General Peter Panchevsky, a former Soviet Army officer. Another former Soviet officer, General Novikov, was in command at the key center of Plovdiv. The size of the Bulgarian Army was not known precisely—certainly it was in excess of the 55,000 permitted by the peace treaty—but in any case, though growing, it was still smaller than the Yugoslav Army and inferior to it also in training and morale. Nevertheless Korea

G
665
648B
701

000